The movement for the Unity of Science has been making headway for a number of years, and each year more workers in the various scientific domains have expressed their interest in it by participating in the discussion of its aims and its specific problems. A characteristic feature of this movement which explains this growing interest is that it does not propose a “super-science” which is to legislate to the special sciences. Its proposal of a Unity of Science is of a (...) different kind, not based upon some grand metaphysical view of any sort. Those who are active within this movement are emphatic in their insistence that instead of aiming at a synthesis of the different sciences on the basis of a prior and independent philosophy, the special sciences will themselves supply their own synthesizing glue. For appreciating the significance of this movement it is therefore necessary to keep in mind that its tendency is toward a unified science, departmentalized into special sciences, and not toward an artificial and speculative juxtaposition of an autonomous philosophy and an autonomous group of sciences. (shrink)

Es wird vorgeschlagen, einen Begriff „Lebenslage“ in den Sozialwissenschaften zu verwenden, der nicht nur „Wohnung“, „Nahrung“, „Kleidung“ und andere Teile des „Realeinkommens“ umfasst, sondern auch „Mortalität“, „Morbidität“ usw. Die gesamte „Lebensstimmung“ einer Person hängt von der Gesamtheit der Lebenslagenteile ab, von der Morbidität ebenso wie von der Wohnung. Ob man die Lebens-Stimmung in „positive“ und „negative“ Elemente zerlegen kann, die man einzelnen Elementen der Lebenslage zuordnet, ist eine offene Frage.Die wissenschaftliche Praxis geht am besten von „Lebenslagenphysiognomien“ (Lebenslagensilhouetten) aus, die durch (...) verschiedenartig gemessene und skalierte Grössen gebildet werden. Wenn man die Lebenslagen einzelner Personen oder ganzer Länder auch nicht stets „skalierend“ zu vergleichen vermag, so kann man sie doch immer beschreiben. Geht man daran, „Lebenslagenkataster“ (Lebenslageninventare) verschiedener Völker und Zeiten aufzustellen, so muss man beachten, dass die Lebensstimmung eines Menschen nicht etwa schon durch die Garten fläche gekennzeichnet wird, die ihm zur Verfügung steht ; man muss angeben, über wieviel Freizeit er verfügt, um die Gartenfläche zu benutzen.Man kann Gesellschaftsordnungen durch die von ihnen „produzierten“ Lebenslagen ln Verbindung mit einer umfassenden „Naturalrechnung“ kennzeichnen. Ob die Geldrechnung in gewissem Ausmass geeignet ist, die Naturalrechnung zu ersetzen, kann nur mit Hilfe der Naturalrechnung entschieden werden, innerhalb deren die Lebenslagenrechnung eine wesentliche Rolle spielt.On propose d'introduire dans les sciences sociales le concept de „situation de vie“, qui englobe non seulement logement, alimentation, vêtement et autres parties du revenu réel, mais aussi mortalité, morbidité, etc. Le „climat de vie“ d'une personne dépend de l'ensemble de sa „situation de vie“, de la morbidité aussi bien que du logement. Est-il possible de décomposer le „climat de vie“ en éléments „positifs“ et „négatifs“, qui correspondraient aux différents éléments de sa „situation de vie“? Réservons provisoirement la question.Si nous envisageons la méthode scientifique, le point de départ le meilleur serait la notion de „physiognomie (silhouette) de vie“. On les dessinerait à l'aide de grandeurs diversement mesurées et graduées.Certes, il ne serait guère possible de comparer les „situations de vie“ de personnes ou de peuples entiers en utilisant une seule échelle de graduation, tout au moins est-il possible de les décrire. Si l'on tente de dresser un „cadastre (inventaire) de situations de vie“ de différents peuples en différentes époques, il ne faut pas oublier que le „climat“ dans lequel vit un individu n'est pas assez déterminé par la surface du jardin qui lui appartient, il faut aussi préciser le loisir dont il dispose pour le cultiver.On peut caractériser les différents régimes sociaux par les situations de vie qu'ils produisent, à condition de combiner cette analyse avec un calcul en nature aussi étendu que possible. Le calcul en argent peut-il remplacer dans une certaine mesure le calcul en nature? La question elle-même ne peut être tranchée qu'à l’aide du calcul en nature qui lui-même dépend largement du calcul des „situations de vie“. (shrink)

A new direction in philosophy Between 1920 and 1940 logical empiricism reset the direction of philosophy of science and much of the rest of Anglo-American philosophy. It began as a relatively organized movement centered on the Vienna Circle, and like-minded philosophers elsewhere, especially in Berlin. As Europe drifted into the Nazi era, several important figures, especially Carnap and Neurath, also found common ground in their liberal politics and radical social agenda. Together, the logical empiricists set out to reform traditional (...) philosophy with a new set of doctrines more firmly grounded in logic and science. Criticism and decline Because of Nazi persecution, most of the European adherents of logical empiricism moved to the United States in the late 1930s. During the 1940s, many of their most cherished tenets became targets of criticism from outsiders as well as from within their own ranks. Philosophers of science in the late 1950s and 1960s rejected logical empiricism and, starting in the 1970s, presented such alternative programs such as scientific realism with evolutionary epistemology. A resurgence of interest During the early 1980s, philosophers and historians of philosophy began to study logical empiricism as an important movement. Unlike their predecessors in the 1960s-for whom the debate over logical empiricism now seems to have been largely motivated by professional politics-these philosopher no longer have to take positions for or against logical empiricism. The result has been a more balanced view of that movement, its achievements, its failures, and its influence. Hard-to-find core writings now available This collection makes available a selection of the most influential and representative writings of the logical empiricists, important contemporary criticisms of their doctrines, their responses, as well as the recent reappraisals. Introductions to each volume examine the articles in historical context and provide importantbackground information that is vital to a full understanding of the issues discussed. They outline prevalent trends, identifying leading figures and summarize their positions and reasoning, as well as those of opposing thinkers. (shrink)

The ignorance about Otto Neurath’s thought and action within the Vienna Circle as well as within the “scientific philosophy” definitely belongs to the past. In the last two decades the rediscovery of Neurath’s legacy represents one of the most significant aspects of the historical and theoretical studies on logical empiricism. As Friedrich Stadler has recently pointed out, “the rediscovery of Neurath [is] not merely a phenomenon of academic nostalgia, but itself constitutes research into the conditions and (...) possibilities of changing a paradigm in the philosophy of science”1. Particulary in the last ten years this re-evaluation has been the subject of numerous books and contributions, which offer a radically new view of the life, the philosophy of science and knowledge, the political and economical thought of Otto Neurath, and, last but not least, of his enthusiastic activity for the Encyclopedia-project. It is sufficient for the readers of this Yearbook to recall the enlightening reconstruction of the emergence of Neurath’s naturalism within the Vienna Circle offered in 1992 by Thomas E. Uebel and the extensive, critical description of Neurath’s work and life which was published in 1996 by Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck and Thomas E. Uebel. (shrink)

This article is about Otto Neurath’s infamous proposal to combat metaphysics by creating and publishing an index of prohibited words. The logic of this proposal is explicated in the frameworks of Neurath’s philosophy of science and his International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. I reconstruct two arguments within Neurath’s project to defend the proposal against criticisms from Neurath’s colleagues and against the charge that philosophers ought not be censors.

Otto Neurath’s empiricist methodology of economics and his contributions to politi- cal economy have gained increasing attention in recent years. We connect this research with contemporary debates regarding the epistemological status of thought experiments by reconstructing Neurath’s utopias as linchpins of thought experiments. In our three reconstructed examples of different uses of utopias/dystopias in thought experiments we employ a reformulation of Häggqvist’s model for thought experiments and we argue that: (1) Our reformulation of Häggqvist’s model more adequately (...) complies with many uses of thought experiments, especially with the open-ended discussions of utopias and dys- topias in thought experiments. (2) As a strict logical empiricist, Neurath is committed to a strictly empiricist account of thought experiments. John Norton’s empiricist argument view can indeed account for the justifications of empirical beliefs and genuine discoveries targeted by scientific utopianism in three distinct (yet connected) ways, all of which Neur- ath already contemplated: (2.I) Dealing with utopias and thought experiments on a regular basis increases creativity and inventiveness. (2.II) Particular ways of presenting knowl- edge facilitate scientific discovery and social progress. (2.III) The use of utopias in thought experiments can prompt conceptual change and allow access to new phenomena. We con- clude by highlighting that, even though thought experiments support a positive attitude for exploring new social possibilities, Neurath points out that active decisions are unavoidable. The exploration of alternatives and the awareness of a need for decisions in policy discus- sion avert a technocratic outlook in social science. (shrink)

Otto Neurath's thesis concerning the structure of protocol sentences is central to the famous Protocol Sentence Debate in the Vienna Circle. However, its precise nature is far from easy to discern in Neurath's writings. So far, only Thomas Uebel has attempted a closer analysis of Neurath's contribution to the debate. I argue that Uebel's interpretation is problematic in some respects and propose a novel analysis, which hopefully brings into a clearer light Neurath's position in the (...) Protocol Sentence Debate as well as his relevance to contemporary philosophies of science. (shrink)

In the first part of this paper I review the two most recent biographies on Otto Neurath and Ludwig von Mises as well as the scarce literature on the relations between their lives and ideas. Recent publications by Nemeth, O’Neill, and Uebel reflect growing interest in the connections between these two main proponents of Logical Empiricism and the Austrian School of Economics respectively, but are mainly focused on the so-called socialist calculation debates. In the second part I propose (...) that additional research on Neurath’s and Mises’ idiosyncratic positions is likely to uncover general relations between epistemological assumptions, economic theories, and political views. -/- . (shrink)

Logical empiricism and the Austrian School of economics are two of the internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. By and large independently of each other, both have been subject to detailed historical and philosophical investigations for the last two dec-ades. However, in spite of numerous connections and interactions be-tween the two groups, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention. My dissertation focuses on the many-faceted juxtaposition of two supposedly antagonistic championsof Viennese Late Enlightenment: logical empiricist Otto (...) class='Hi'>Neurath and Austrian economist Ludwig Mises. I rationally reconstruct and critically compare their epistemological, meth-odological, and economic positions and demonstrate that a closer look reveals more compatibilities and similarities than acknowledged by the received view and by the protagonists themselves. Over and above the historiographic task of challenging and amending this received view, the analytic components of my thesis inform contemporary debates in phi-losophy, politics, economics, and other sciences. (shrink)

Otto Neurath’s empiricist methodology of economics and his contributions to political economy have gained increasing attention in recent years. We connect this research with contemporary debates regarding the epistemological status of thought experiments by reconstructing Neurath’s utopias as linchpins of thought experiments. In our three reconstructed examples of different uses of utopias/dystopias in thought experiments we employ a reformulation of Häggqvist’s model for thought experiments and we argue that: (1) Our reformulation of Häggqvist’s model more adequately complies (...) with many uses of thought experiments, especially with the open-ended discussions of utopias and dystopias in thought experiments. (2) As a strict logical empiricist, Neurath is committed to a strictly empiricist account of thought experiments. John Norton’s empiricist argument view can indeed account for the justifications of empirical beliefs and genuine discoveries targeted by scientific utopianism in three distinct (yet connected) ways, all of which Neurath already contemplated: (2.I) Dealing with utopias and thought experiments on a regular basis increases creativity and inventiveness. (2.II) Particular ways of presenting knowledge facilitate scientific discovery and social progress. (2.III) The use of utopias in thought experiments can prompt conceptual change and allow access to new phenomena. We conclude by highlighting that, even though thought experiments support a positive attitude for exploring new social possibilities, Neurath points out that active decisions are unavoidable. The exploration of alternatives and the awareness of a need for decisions in policy discussion avert a technocratic outlook in social science. (shrink)

While the Vienna Circle had virtually no impact on the Czech-speaking philosophical community during the 1930s, one can find a curious meeting point in the field of theory of architecture. There is now a growing literature on Otto Neurath as a theorist of architecture and urbanism, who emphasized the social aspects of modern building and approached architecture from his idiosyncratic viewpoint of Marxism interpreted as a physicalistic social science. It is less well known that a young Czech architecture (...) critic and theorist, Karel Teige, cultivated strikingly similar views during the same period—from 1920s to 1930s—albeit without any knowledge of Neurath’s thought in particular, or for that matter the Vienna Circle in general. The chapter reveals similarities as well as differences between Neurath and Teige on Marxism, science and architecture, and the Bauhaus, as well as a discussion of the relations of both to the contemporaries, most importantly Adolf Loos, Josef Frank and Hannes Meyer. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to discuss some normative aspects of Otto Neurath’s concept of scientific knowledge. I will take some reflections of Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist known for his harsh criticism of “philosophers” as a point of reference. I have decided to employ his “non-philosophical” perspective because of its convergence with the very tradition to which the Institute Vienna Circle has aligned itself. That tradition derived the form and power of its beginnings from the unbiased attitude, (...) the impartiality of its intellectual and scientific standpoint. This impartial attitude was all but naive I wish to claim; it was the result of a conscious effort to liberate the philosophical vision from the sediments of a history of perception and thought that had reached its end in the 19th century.1 Of course, that that history had come to its end was felt by many scientists, philosophers and artists at the beginning of this century. What distinguished the Vienna Circle was that its members reacted with new insights into the nature of knowledge, indeed with the attempt to develop the impartiality of the scientific point of view. What had been in the foreground up to that time receded into the background for those versed in modern formal logic and empirical science. The disciplinary boundaries, most notably those between the natural sciences and the humanities became blurred. What we know became so complex and rich that traditional forms of classification were revealed as inadequate. For Neurath “Unified Science” was the name for future forms of classification and “encyclopedia” the name for the “orchestration” of the individual sciences. What remained of “philosophy” focussed on the logical analysis of language and — long neglected — the historical and practical aspects of science. Taking these general developments as my background here I want to defend the thesis that working on the “impartiality” of the scientist’s point of view can be seen as a contribution to and work on the normative dimensions of knowledge. In the case of the Vienna Circle and Otto Neurath such a contribution has nothing to do with developing a scientific conception of ethics or rationality.2 Rather it represents an attempt to analyze the scientific approach to reality and to reinforce the social effects of this approach by making it more precise. Viewed in this context Neurath’s project of a “scientific world conception” coincides with some perspectives whose topicality cannot be overestimated, Pierre Bourdieu’s epistemological reflections on sociology among them. (shrink)

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

This paper provides a description and analysis of Wilhelm Neurath's economics and theory of value. Otto Neurath's rejection of a distinct methodology for social science and his insistence on the political partisanship of scientific sociology, I argue, represent his attempt to both continue the practical orientation of his father's theorizing and answer the normative problem his father's theories faced.

It is one of the distinctive claims of Neurath, though not of the Vienna Circle generally, that the Vienna Circle's philosophy was not really German philosophy at all. The relation is, if Neurath is to be trusted, anything but straight-forward. To understand it, not only must some effort be expended on specifying Neurath's claim, but also on delineating the different party-lines within the Vienna Circle.

Four distinguished authors have been brought together to produce this elegant study of a much-neglected figure. The book is divided into three sections: Neurath's biographical background and the economic and social context of his ideas; his theory of science; and the development of his role in debates on Marxist concepts of history and his own conception of science. Coinciding with the emerging serious interest in logical positivism, this timely publication will redress a current imbalance in the history and philosophy (...) of science. (shrink)

This paper provides a description and analysis of Wilhelm Neurath's economics and theory of value. Otto Neurath's rejection of a distinct methodology for social science and his insistence on the political partisanship of scientific sociology, I argue, represent his attempt to both continue the practical orientation of his father's theorizing and answer the normative problem his father's theories faced.

Otto Neurath (1882-1945) was a highly unorthodox thinker both in philosophy and economics. The contributions to this sparkling new book conclude that Neurath touched on many of the most critical problems of economic theory during its formative years as a modern discipline. His economics provide insights into the foundational problems of modern economics and should encourage contemporary economic theorists to critically reflect their own hidden presumptions.

Autour du Manifeste de Vienne se trouvent reunis des textes fondateurs ecrits autour de 1929. Leurs auteurs: Carnap, Hahn, Neurath, Schlick l'ame du Cercle de Vienne, et Waismann plus proche de Wittgenstein, temoignent d'un courant philosophique constituant aujourd'hui la tradition analytique de source continentale a la fois empiriste et logique. Forme de maniere informelle a Vienne, au coeur de l'Europe, le Cercle reunissait des savants de differentes branches qui voulaient se donner une philosophie susceptible d' unifier leurs vues. Echo (...) aux reves d'unite de la science, cette philosophie en exprime aussi le renversement complet. Veritable Discours de la methode, mais d'esprit anti-cartesien, elle entend reconstruire la science de maniere a evincer la speculation metaphysique, le but etant qu'aucun enonce ne soit laisse a l'exterieur de cette grande architecture de symboles s'il etait pourvu de sens. La declaration de guerre contre la metaphysique est un geste de militance a une epoque riche en differents manifestes. Incomprehensible en dehors du contexte socio-politique viennois de ces annees, elle porte aussi un programme de reconstruction rationnelle qui, au dela du langage de la science, devait toucher tous les secteurs de la vie. Plus complexe qu'il n'y parait, ce programme contient, en reference a Wittgenstein, son prestigieux representant a cote d'Einstein et Russell, une mise en garde contre differentes formes d'irrationalismes, qui est d'actualite. (shrink)

Am Wiener Kreis scheiden sich die Geister, trat er doch mit dem dezidierten Anspruch auf, mit den Mitteln der modernen Logik den metaphysischen Schutt von Jahrtausenden aus dem Weg zu räumen. Statt einer homogenen Bewegung, die sich empiristischen Dogmen verschrieb, erscheint der Wiener Kreis in der philosophischen Forschung jedoch heute als eine heterogene Gruppe von eigenständigen Denkern, die gemeinsam die Grundlagen der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie legten. In jeweils spezifischer Weise setzten sie sich von der philosophischen Tradition ab oder versuchten, einzelne Teile (...) davon in die wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung zu integrieren. Der Band enthält eine repräsentative Auswahl von Aufsätzen der Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises. Sie beschränkt sich mit Ausnahme dreier Frühschriften der Gründer bewußt auf die Jahre des historischen Kreises vom Beginn der Treffen 1924 bis zur Ermordung Schlicks 1936, obwohl einige der Hauptideen erst in den USA ihre volle Wirkung entfalteten und von dort Ende der sechziger Jahre wieder in die deutschsprachige Philosophie zurückwirkten. In ihrer Einleitung skizzieren die Herausgeber die historische Entwicklung des Kreises und erläutern die zentralen thematischen Fragestellungen. Die Anmerkungen identifizieren die internen wie externen Opponenten und erklären den Kontext der zeitgenössischen Wissenschaft. (shrink)